We propose a model of two-tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the Bertrand result may not obtain, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium, which is detrimental to consumers' surplus and social welfare. We obtain that these partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce. We then use our model to assess the impact of several regulatory tools in the telecommunications industry.
Introduction
In several industries, production has a two-tier structure: firms need to obtain an intermediate input in order to serve final consumers. In this paper, we focus on industries in which the intermediate input is produced by vertically integrated firms only. Examples of such a market structure abound. In the broadband market, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) operators and cable networks own a broadband infrastructure and compete at the retail level. They can also compete to provide wholesale broadband services to unintegrated downstream firms, which have not built their own network. Similarly, in the mobile telephony market, Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) do not have a spectrum license nor a mobile network and therefore have to purchase a wholesale mobile service from Mobile Network Operators (MNOs).
Other examples can be found in licensing contexts. For instance, at the end of the 1990s, Dow Chemicals and Exxon had developed rival metallocene technologies, which enabled them to produce polyethylenes. They also licensed their technologies to downstream polyethylenes producers.
2 In the video game industry, some firms (e.g., Epic Games, Valve Corporation) have designed their own 3D engines to develop 3D video games. They also license these engines to rival downstream firms (e.g., Electronic Arts).
This raises the following question: does competition between vertically integrated firms on the upstream market level the playing field between the downstream rivals? More specifically,
we notice that in all the examples mentioned above, downstream entrants have managed to get access to the intermediate input.
3 Yet, should we expect competition on the upstream market to drive the input price down to marginal cost?
To answer this question, we propose a model in which two vertically integrated firms and an unintegrated downstream firm compete in prices with differentiated products on a downstream market. The goods sold to end-users are derived from an intermediate input that
the integrated firms can produce in-house. Integrated firms compete, first on the upstream market to provide the input to the unintegrated downstream firm, and second on the downstream market with the unintegrated downstream firm. The upstream market exhibits the usual ingredients of tough competition: integrated firms compete in (linear) prices, produce a perfectly homogeneous upstream good and incur the same constant marginal cost. Yet, we show that upstream competition may not drive the input price down to marginal cost, thereby giving rise to partial foreclosure equilibria. In particular, there can exist monopolylike equilibria, in which one vertically integrated firm supplies the intermediate input at its monopoly upstream price, while its integrated rival decides optimally to make no upstream offer.
The intuition is the following. Assume that integrated firm i supplies the wholesale market at a strictly positive price-cost margin, and consider the incentives of its integrated rival j to corner that market. Notice first that, when firm i increases its downstream price, it recognizes that some of the final consumers it loses will eventually purchase from the unintegrated downstream firm, thereby increasing upstream demand and revenues. This implies that firm i charges a higher downstream price than its integrated rival j at the downstream equilibrium. This effect obviously benefits firm j, which faces a less aggressive competitor on the final market: this is the softening effect. Now, if firm j undercuts firm i on the upstream market and becomes the upstream supplier, the roles are reversed: firm i decreases its downstream price, while firm j increases it. To sum up, firm j faces the following trade-off when deciding whether to undercut. On the one hand, undercutting yields wholesale profits; on the other hand, it makes integrated firm i more aggressive on the downstream market. When the latter effect is strong enough, the incentives to undercut vanish and the Bertrand logic collapses.
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This implies that, when the softening effect is strong enough, the monopoly outcome on the upstream market may persist even under the threat of competition on that market. Other equilibria may exist, but monopoly-like equilibria are Pareto-dominant from the integrated firms' viewpoint. Besides, as expected, partial foreclosure equilibria tend to degrade both social welfare and consumer surplus.
The degree of differentiation at the downstream level has an important impact on the strength of the softening effect, hence on the competitiveness of the upstream market. Intuitively, when final products are strongly differentiated, downstream demands are almost independent and the softening effect is consequently weak. As a result, undercutting on the upstream market is always profitable, and competition drives the wholesale price down to marginal cost. Conversely, when downstream products are strong substitutes, the softening effect is strong and the monopoly outcome is an equilibrium.
Another key determinant for the emergence of partial foreclosure equilibria is the efficiency of the unintegrated downstream firm. An inefficient downstream competitor sets higher downstream prices, supplies fewer downstream consumers, and therefore, demands less intermediate input. This tends to reduce the upstream profits, which weakens the incentives to undercut and makes partial foreclosure a more likely outcome.
We obtain an even stronger result under two-part tariff competition. We show that partial foreclosure equilibria with strictly positive upstream profits always exist when firms compete in two-part tariffs on the upstream market.
Our framework is especially relevant to analyze competition on wholesale markets in the telecommunications industry. As we have just seen, wholesale competition in telecoms may fail to develop, and therefore, there may be a scope for regulatory intervention in these markets. We show that several regulatory tools, which have been considered or implemented by telecoms regulators, can destroy all partial foreclosure equilibria. First, we derive conditions on the demand and cost functions, under which a wholesale price cap can restore the competitiveness of the upstream market. Second, the vertical separation of an integrated firm, or the entry of an unintegrated upstream competitor, can destroy partial foreclosure equilibria.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. The literature on one-way access pricing deals with situations in which a service-based firm must gain access to the network of a historical incumbent (Laffont and Tirole 2001 , Armstrong 2002 , de Bijl and Peitz 2002 .
These works are, by definition, silent on the issue of wholesale competition.
The question addressed in this paper closely echoes the old antitrust debate on the anticompetitive effects of vertical integration. According to the traditional foreclosure doctrine, vertical integration can be anticompetitive, since vertically integrated firms have incentives to raise their rivals' costs. This theory was criticized by Chicago School authors (see Bork 1978 and Posner 1976) , on the ground that firms cannot leverage market power from one market to another one. More recently, the literature on vertical mergers has revisited these issues by analyzing extensively wholesale competition between a vertically integrated firm and an unintegrated upstream firm. Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) argue that such a market structure is unlikely to yield tough competition on the wholesale market when the vertically integrated firm can commit ex ante to its upstream price. Choi and Yi (2000) provide foundations for this commitment power through the choice of input specification.
With upstream cost asymmetries and upstream switching costs, Chen (2001) shows that the integrated firm partially forecloses its unintegrated downstream rival in equilibrium. Chen and Riordan (2007) argue that an exclusive dealing contract enables the integrated firm to implement partial foreclosure in equilibrium.
5 Surprisingly, this strand of literature has not dealt with wholesale competition between vertically integrated structures, which, as we argued previously, is crucial in several industries. Our main result is that upstream competition between integrated firms may lead to equilibrium foreclosure even in the absence of upstream 5 See also Sandonis and Fauli-Oller (2006) for an analysis of vertical integration in a licensing context. 4 commitment power, input choice specification, upstream cost asymmetries or switching costs, and exclusive dealing contracts.
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Two recent exceptions are Ordover and Shaffer (2007) and Brito and Pereira (2006) , who present models with several vertically integrated firms and a downstream entrant. They are mainly interested in whether a wholesale market will emerge at all, i.e., whether the entrant can be completely foreclosed in equilibrium. In both papers, when non-integrated competitors are able to obtain the input, competition between integrated firms on the upstream market leads them to price the input at its marginal cost. By contrast, we work out a more general model and show that partial foreclosure can actually arise at equilibrium. Our predictions are therefore drastically different from theirs: the fact that entry does occur, as is the case in the industries mentioned earlier, is not sufficient to ensure that competition on the input market levels the playing field between the downstream rivals. Höffler and Schmidt (2008) take a complementary perspective and study the impact on consumers' surplus of the entry of unintegrated downstream firms. They show that service-based competition can be detrimental to consumers, due to the softening effect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents our main results. Section 4 analyzes the efficacy of several regulatory tools. Section 5 discusses several extensions and robustness checks of our basic framework. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Firms. There are two vertically integrated firms, denoted by 1 and 2, and one unintegrated Both integrated firms produce the upstream good under constant returns to scale at unit cost c u . The downstream product is derived from the intermediate input on a one-to-one basis with the twice continuously differentiable cost function c k (.), for firm k ∈ {1, 2, d}. We assume that integrated firms have the same downstream cost function: c 1 (.) = c 2 (.).
6 Salinger (1988) and Nocke and White (2007) consider situations in which several integrated firms compete on the wholesale market. These papers, however, do not study tough price competition. The former assumes Cournot competition on both markets, while the latter focuses on tacit collusion on the input market.
7 Hart and Tirole (1990) have initiated another strand of the vertical foreclosure literature, which analyzes the consequences of secret upstream offers, and focuses mainly on the commitment problem faced by an upstream monopolist.
Markets. All firms compete in prices on the downstream market and provide imperfect substitutes to final customers. Let p k be the downstream price set by firm k ∈ {1, 2, d} and p ≡ (p 1 , p 2 , p d ) the vector of final prices. Firm k's demand, denoted by D k (p), is twice continuously differentiable; it depends negatively on firm k's price and positively on its competitors' prices: ∂D k /∂p k ≤ 0 with a strict inequality whenever D k > 0, and ∂D k /∂p k ≥ 0 with a strict inequality whenever D k > 0 and D k > 0, for k = k ∈ {1, 2, d}. We also suppose that the total demand is non-increasing in each price: for all k ∈ {1, 2, d}, k∈{1,2,d} ∂D k /∂p k ≤ 0. Symmetry of the integrated firms is assumed again:
On the upstream market, integrated firms compete in prices and offer perfectly homogeneous products. We denote by a i the upstream price set by integrated firm i ∈ {1, 2}.
8 The structure of the model is summarized in Figure 1 . Stage 2 -Downstream competition: All firms set their prices on the downstream market.
Final Consumers
We focus on pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibria and reason by backward induction.
Profits. Assume that the unintegrated downstream firm is active on the downstream market. The profit of integrated firm i ∈ {1, 2} which supplies the upstream market at price a i is:
The profit of integrated firm j = i ∈ {1, 2} which does not supply the upstream market is given by:π
The profit of unintegrated downstream firm d is:
Note that when the upstream price is equal to the upstream unit cost, i.e., a i = c u , there is no upstream profit and all firms compete on a level playing field. This is the perfect competition outcome on the upstream market.
Main Results

Preliminaries
Downstream market competition. Consider that at least one integrated firm has made an acceptable upstream offer, i.e., an offer that allows firm d to be active and earn strictly positive profits on the downstream market. Denote by i ∈ {1, 2} the upstream supplier.
10 We assume that BR
is unique, bounded and well-defined by the corresponding first-order condition for any p −k ∈ [0, ∞) 2 and any acceptable a i . In order to obtain well-behaved comparative statics, we make the following stability assumption:
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We assume that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium on the downstream market, and we denote by p
k (a i ) the equilibrium price of firm k ∈ {1, 2, d}, and by p (i) (a i ) the vector of these downstream prices. At the equilibrium of this subgame, firms' profits are given by functions π
, which are defined over the set of acceptable offers.
Note that, when the upstream product is priced at marginal cost, p
Choice of upstream supplier. If only one integrated firm has made an acceptable offer, then it is obviously chosen by the unintegrated downstream firm.
Consider now that both offers are acceptable. If π 12 We now make the following economically meaningful assumption:
is strictly decreasing.
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If firm d preferred to choose the most expensive upstream provider, we would have another, somewhat trivial (and pathological), reason for the existence of partial foreclosure equilibria.
Assumption 1 rules out these cases.
Upstream monopoly benchmark. Consider the hypothetical scenario in which the upstream market is monopolized by integrated firm i. We assume for the moment that, in this case, firm i makes an acceptable offer to firm d:
Assumption 2. When integrated firm j has made no acceptable upstream offer, integrated firm i cannot, or does not want to, completely foreclose firm d.
It follows immediately that complete foreclosure of the unintegrated downstream firm will never arise in equilibrium. In Section 5.2, we relax Assumption 2 and we show that it can hold because firm i actually wants to supply firm d in order to attract new consumers, or because of regulatory constraints, or because firm d can invest to start producing the input in-house.
We also assume:
is strictly quasi-concave, and it has a unique maximum at a m > c u .
12 Other tie-breaking rules would not change our results. For instance, in Section 5.1, we consider the possibility that firm d splits its upstream demand between integrated firms.
13 In line with most IO models, Assumption 1 posits that the direct effect of a cost increase on profit outweighs the strategic ones.
8
To summarize, if the upstream market were exogenously monopolized, the unintegrated downstream firm would not be completely foreclosed, and monopoly market power on the upstream market would lead to a strictly positive markup on the price of the intermediate input, i.e., to partial foreclosure. In the sequel, a m is referred to as the monopoly upstream price.
At this stage, we can already notice that, under Assumptions 1 and 3, integrated firms offering a 1 = a 2 = c u is an equilibrium outcome.
Remark 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, the perfect competition outcome on the upstream market is an equilibrium.
Proof. Consider that integrated firms offer a 1 = a 2 = c u . Then, if firm d elects firm i as its upstream supplier, π
If an integrated firm deviates upwards, then, by Assumption 1, firm d still purchases the input at marginal cost from the other integrated firm, and the integrated firms' profits are not affected. If on the other hand, an integrated firm, say i, deviates downwards by setting a i < c u , its profit becomes π
i is strictly quasi-concave and a m > c u .
Persistence of the monopoly outcome
We now study the first stage of our game in which integrated firms compete on the upstream market, and establish the main result of the paper. We show that the usual mechanism of Bertrand competition may be flawed and that partial foreclosure equilibria may exist.
Assume that integrated firm i has made an acceptable upstream offer to firm d, a i > c u , and let us see whether integrated firm j = i is willing to slightly undercut to corner the upstream market, as would be the case with standard (single-market) Bertrand competition.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we look at prices at the downstream equilibrium.
Second, we compare the profits of firms i and j.
The integrated firms' best-responses on the downstream market are characterized by the following first-order conditions:
The comparison between (1) and (2) indicates that the upstream supplier has more incentives to raise its downstream price than its integrated rival. Realizing that final customers lost on the downstream market may be recovered via the upstream market, the upstream supplier is less aggressive than its integrated rival on the downstream market. As formally shown in Appendix, this mechanism, together with our stability assumption, implies that the upstream supplier charges a higher downstream price than its integrated rival at the subgame equilibrium. Lemma 1. Let a i > c u be an acceptable offer. Then the upstream supplier charges a strictly higher downstream price than its integrated rival:
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
This soft behavior favors the other integrated firm which, by a revealed preference argument, earns more downstream profit than the upstream supplier. We shall refer to that mechanism as the 'softening effect'. Lemma 2. Let a i > c u be an acceptable offer. Then, the upstream supplier earns strictly smaller downstream profits than its integrated rival:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
A key consequence of that result is that we cannot tell unambiguously which of the integrated firms earns more total profits. On the one hand, the upstream supplier extracts revenues from the upstream market. On the other hand, its integrated rival benefits from larger downstream profits, owing to the softening effect.
We can now come back to our initial question. When an integrated firm undercuts the upstream market, it obtains the upstream profits at the cost of making its integrated rival more aggressive on the downstream market. Therefore an integrated firm may not always want to undercut its integrated rival on the upstream market. Notice that we do not need any assumptions on the strategic interactions between downstream prices to obtain this tradeoff between capturing the upstream profits and benefiting from the softening effect. When the latter effect outweighs the former, the usual logic of Bertrand competition may not work anymore, and in particular, the monopoly outcome can be an equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-3, there exists an equilibrium in which the upstream market is supplied by an integrated firm at price a m if and only if
These equilibria are referred to as monopoly-like equilibria.
Proof. Assume that condition (3) holds. Suppose firm i offers a i = a m and firm j makes an unacceptable offer. Then, firm j has no incentives to undercut firm i and, by Assumptions 2 and 3, firm i has no incentives to deviate. Conversely, assume that condition (3) As compared to the existing literature, we do not specify the downstream demand functions. This allows us to stay at a higher level of generality. Ordover and Shaffer (2007) consider a linear specification and a particular range of parameters over which condition (3) is not satisfied (see footnote 21). In Brito and Pereira (2006) , there is a third integrated firm, and downstream competition takes place on the Salop circle. Two of the integrated firms are not in interaction with each other on the downstream market, and the third integrated firm does not interact with the entrant, which considerably weakens the softening effect. As a consequence, condition (3) does not hold in their framework.
16 By carefully picking apart the effects which govern firms' undercutting decisions, we show that these results have limitations, and that one cannot predict the outcome of the upstream price competition game without assessing the strength of the softening effect.
Other equilibria
In this section, we give a complete characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibria of our game.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, there exists an equilibrium, in which a 1 = a 2 = a * if and only if a * ≤ a m and π
j (a * ). These equilibria are referred to as matching-like equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In a matching-like equilibrium, both integrated firms offer the same upstream price and are indifferent between supplying the upstream market and not supplying it. Notice that the perfect competition outcome a 1 = a 2 = c u is always a (matching-like) equilibrium outcome, as already stated in Remark 1.
However, nothing precludes the existence of other matching-like equilibria featuring either a supra-competitive upstream market (a * > c u ) or a super-competitive upstream market (a * < c u ). The existence of these equilibria also hinges on the softening effect. For a * > c u , the integrated firm which does not supply the upstream market benefits from the softening effect and does not want to undercut. For a * < c u , the softening effect is reversed. The upstream supplier offers a low downstream price to reduce the upstream demand, which hurts its integrated rival. Even though the upstream supplier makes losses on the upstream market, it does not want to exit that market since it would then suffer from an adverse softening effect.
We conclude this paragraph with the following result:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-3:
• Only monopoly-like and matching-like outcomes can arise in equilibrium.
• From the viewpoint of the integrated firms, any monopoly-like equilibrium Pareto-dominates any matching-like equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 provide a characterization of all the possible equilibria of our game. Moreover, the monopoly-like equilibria, when they exist, Pareto-dominate all other equilibria from the integrated firms' standpoint. Therefore there is a strong presumption that these equilibria will actually be played when they exist.
Last, as intuition suggests, one can show that, under additional reasonable assumptions, partial foreclosure equilibria degrade consumers' surplus and social welfare. 18 In that situation, the wholesale profit of the upstream supplier is fully disconnected from its retail behavior and the softening effect disappears. Hence, with an unintegrated downstream firm on a niche market, the perfect competition outcome always emerges in equilibrium.
Downstream demands are derived from the maximization of a representative consumer's utility with the following quasi-linear preferences:
where q 0 denotes consumption of the numeraire and q k is consumption of product k ∈ {1, 2, d}.
These preferences generate the following demand functions:
γ ≥ 0 parameterizes the degree of differentiation between final products, which can be interpreted as the intensity of downstream competition. Perfect competition corresponds to γ approaching infinity and local monopolies to γ = 0. All firms have the same linear downstream costs: c k (q) = cq. 19 With that specification, the assumptions we have made on the second stage demands, payoff functions, best-responses, etc. are satisfied. Assumptions 1 and 3 are satisfied as well. Finally, we also suppose that Assumption 2 holds.
Figure 2 offers a graphical representation of the profit functions π
. As discussed in Section 3.2, when a i > c u , two opposite effects are at work. On the one hand, the upstream supplier derives profit from the upstream market; on the other hand, its integrated rival benefits from the softening effect on the downstream market. When the upstream price is not too high, the upstream profit effect dominates and π
When the upstream price is high enough, upstream revenues shrink, the softening effect is strengthened and π We then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Consider the symmetric linear case. There existsγ > 0 such that:
If γ ≥γ, then there exist four equilibrium outcomes on the upstream market:
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• the perfect competition outcome;
• a supra-competitive matching-like outcome;
• two monopoly-like outcomes.
Otherwise, the perfect competition outcome is the only equilibrium outcome.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
To grasp the intuition of the proposition, suppose that the upstream market is supplied at the monopoly upstream price. When the substitutability between final products is strong, the integrated firm which supplies the upstream market is reluctant to set too low a downstream price since this would strongly contract its upstream profit. The other integrated firm benefits from a substantial softening effect and, as a result, is not willing to corner the upstream market. There exists a monopoly-like equilibrium when downstream products are sufficient 20 The perfect competition and monopoly-like equilibria are stable; the matching-like is unstable.
substitutes. By the reverse token, only the perfect competition outcome emerges when the competition on the downstream market is sufficiently weak.
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Proposition 4 highlights a tension between competitiveness on the downstream market and competitiveness on the upstream market. Intuitively, the same downstream interactions which strengthen the competitive pressure on the downstream market, are those which soften the competitive pressure on the upstream market. This tension is revealed in downstream prices, which turn out to be non-monotonic in the substitutability parameter (provided that a monopoly-like equilibrium is selected when it exists). The level of downstream prices results indeed from two combined forces: the level of upstream prices on the one hand, and the intensity of downstream competition/substitutability on the other hand.
This suggests that strongly differentiated unintegrated downstream firms are more likely to enter in the market, not only because entrants have incentives to differentiate to avoid head-to-head competition, but also because they are more likely to benefit from attractive wholesale offers by integrated firms. The evidence in the mobile market is consistent with this interpretation. Indeed, many MVNOs target specific market segments, either by using their brand reputation, 22 or by investing in network elements to increase their differentiation possibilities. 
Efficiency of the entrant
Another key determinant of partial foreclosure is the efficiency of the unintegrated downstream firm. Intuitively, an efficient entrant tends to obtain a large market share and to purchase large quantities of input on the upstream market. This raises the upstream profit effect and, in turn, strengthens the vertically integrated firms' incentives to cut upstream prices. Therefore, we expect the upstream market to be more competitive when the entrant is more efficient. 21 Ordover and Shaffer (2007) consider the same example, but they restrict their attention to γ ≤ 10 while γ > 10. This is the reason why the condition for monopoly-like equilibria never holds in their paper.
22 For instance, teenagers for Virgin Mobile in the UK or NRJ Mobile in France. 23 For instance, Euskaltel and Budget Telecom are 'full' MVNOs, i.e., they own all the network elements of a traditional mobile operator except the radio equipments. They specifically offer cross-border services.
• If δ ≥ δ(γ), then there are four equilibrium outcomes: Two monopoly-like outcomes, a matching-like outcome, and the perfect competition outcome.
• Otherwise, the perfect competition outcome is the only equilibrium.
Proof. See our web appendix (Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet and Schutz, 2010 , Section I.1).
When firm d is rather inefficient (δ ≥ δ(γ)) the gains from supplying the upstream market are small, as firm d purchases a small quantity of input. The upstream profit effect is weak.
Moreover, the softening effect, which operates at the margin, is not affected by the size of the upstream demand. Therefore, when the entrant is rather inefficient, the incentives to undercut the upstream market are small and partial foreclosure arises in equilibrium.
Regulation
We have just seen that competition on wholesale markets may fail to develop, thereby giving rise to partial foreclosure equilibria. In this section, we show that several tools, which have been used or considered by telecoms regulators, such as a wholesale price cap, the entry of an unintegrated upstream competitor, or the vertical separation of an integrated operator, can restore the competitiveness of the upstream market.
Price cap
In several countries (e.g., France, Spain, Belgium, Italy), the telecoms regulator sets a price at which the broadband incumbent has to supply any service-based firm. This does not prevent the incumbent from negotiating lower tariffs with downstream firms. Therefore, the regulated price can be seen as a price cap on the incumbent's wholesale offer. In the following, we show that this kind of regulation can favor the development of tough wholesale competition, and remove all partial foreclosure equilibria, even if the price cap is strictly above marginal cost.
As a first step, let us inspect Figure 2 , which depicts firms' profits in the symmetric linear case. Notice that for any a i ∈ (c u , a * ), π
j (a i ): in this range of upstream prices, it is always better to be the upstream supplier. Consequently, if the regulator sets any price cap between c u and a * , then, the only equilibrium is the perfect competition outcome. Now we would like to extend this result to more general demand and cost systems. A price cap a > c u eliminates all partial foreclosure equilibria if π
, it follows immediately that there exists a price cap strictly above marginal cost which restores the competitiveness of the upstream market if
The following proposition provides sufficient conditions under which this inequality is satisfied:
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Proposition 6. Assume that firms' downstream divisions are identical, downstream costs are weakly convex, and
• downstream prices are strategic complements and
• or,
A low enough price cap, strictly above the upstream marginal cost, destroys all partial foreclosure equilibria, and the perfect competition outcome remains an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
A price cap can restore the competitiveness of the wholesale market, provided that the upstream supplier earns more profits than its integrated rival when the upstream price is slightly above the marginal cost. Put differently, the upstream profit effect has to dominate the softening effect for a i sufficiently close to c u . A good proxy to assess the strength of the softening effect is the difference between the upstream supplier's and the integrated rival's downstream prices. This gap is small if the upstream supplier does not raise its downstream price by much when the upstream price increases, which is the case when a firm's demand is concave with respect to its own price, and downstream costs are convex. Besides, if prices are strategic complements, the integrated rival increases its price as well, which implies an even smaller gap between downstream prices, hence, a small softening effect. This is the first sufficient condition in Proposition 6. Second, even if the upstream supplier does increase its price a lot, the gap may still be small if the integrated rival reacts by also increasing its price a lot, namely, if downstream prices are strongly strategic complements. A sufficient condition for this is
and convex costs. This is the second sufficient condition in the proposition.
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We would like to emphasize that Proposition 6 does not come from a simple mechanical effect. Of course, imposing a price cap reduces the upstream price mechanically. But, more fundamentally, under the assumptions detailed in Proposition 6, a price cap initiates a 24 We did not manage to obtain a general result when firms are asymmetric. Still, it can be shown that when demand is linear and firm d has a cost differential δ, profit functions are as depicted in Figure 2 and a price cap can always restore the competitiveness of the upstream market.
25 It should be noticed that this reasoning, which derives conditions for the upstream profit effect to dominate the softening effect, is only valid in the neighborhood of c u . Therefore, the sufficient conditions given in Proposition 6 do not imply that partial foreclosure equilibria do not exist. For instance, in the symmetric linear case, both sufficient conditions hold and monopoly-like equilibria exist when γ is high enough.
process by which integrated firms will undercut each other, leading to tough competition in the wholesale market. Interestingly, a price cap can influence the outcome of the market even though the regulatory constraint does not bind (i.e., the upstream price is strictly smaller than the price cap) in equilibrium. Therefore, a regulator who observes an entrant getting access to the input at a price strictly below the price cap should not conclude that the price cap is useless. Note also that it is sufficient to impose a price cap on one of the integrated firms only to fuel competition in the wholesale market.
We conclude this subsection by noting that the threat of investment by firm d can have the same impact as a price cap on the wholesale market. Consider the following alteration of our game: between stage 1 and stage 2, after having observed the integrated firms' upstream offers, the unintegrated downstream firm can pay a sunk investment cost to build its own network. If it does so, it becomes able to produce the intermediate input at marginal cost c u . If the investment cost is not too large, there is a thresholdā, such that firm d invests if, and only if the cheapest wholesale offer is aboveā. Since integrated firms prefer to face a relatively less efficient competitor, at least one integrated firm will make an offer belowā to prevent firm d from investing: firms behave exactly as ifā were a price cap. If the cost of bypass is low, thenā is low as well, and, under the assumptions of Proposition 6, the input price goes down to marginal cost. This result has interesting policy implications. In the mobile industry, it means that favorable terms for spectrum licences (e.g., terms for ungranted mobile licences, or for Wimax licences) can increase MNOs' incentives to set low wholesale prices for MVNOs. In the broadband market, it implies that favorable conditions for local loop unbundling investments (e.g., low rates for colocation in the historical operator's premises) might stimulate the development of the wholesale broadband market.
Entry of an unintegrated upstream competitor
Suppose that, in addition to integrated firms 1 and 2, an unintegrated upstream competitor, firm u, is able to produce the intermediate input at constant marginal cost c u . There are two situations in which such an upstream unit can enter the wholesale market. First, local authorities can invest in broadband networks and offer wholesale services to service-based operators.
26 Second, some private companies can decide to enter as unintegrated upstream 26 In France, at the end of 2007, 2% of the population had no access to broadband services. In addition to these so-called 'white zones', the French regulator, ARCEP, keeps track of the 'grey zones', in which only the incumbent operator France Télécom has installed broadband equipments. ARCEP views investments by municipalities in both 'white' and 'grey' zones as legitimate; in the white zones, to offer broadband services; in the grey zones, to foster facility-based competition. In March 2008, there were 55 projects from municipalities for a total amount of 1.3 billion euros. Out of a total number of 2,674 main distribution frames in October providers. For instance, in the broadband market, firms like Covad or Northpoint in the US, or Mangoosta in France, adopted this strategy. In the mobile market, so-called mobile virtual enablers (MVNEs) are also unintegrated upstream firms.
27 In both cases, we argue that the entry of an unintegrated upstream competitor stimulates competition in wholesale markets more surely than entry of (and competition between) integrated firms. Intuitively, an unintegrated upstream firm is not subject to the softening effect, since it does not participate to the downstream market. As a result, the entry of firm u restores the competitiveness of the upstream market:
Proposition 7. Assume that prices are strategic complements. When an unintegrated upstream firm enters the industry, all partial foreclosure equilibria disappear, and the perfect competition outcome remains an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The intuition for Proposition 7 is the following. If integrated firm i ∈ {1, 2} supplies the upstream market at price a i > c u , then, firm u always wants to undercut, for its sole source of profit comes from the upstream market. Conversely, if firm u supplies the upstream market at price a u > c u , then, firm 1 wants to undercut for two reasons. First, undercutting enables firm 1 to capture the upstream profits. Second, when firm 1 becomes the upstream supplier, it behaves less aggressively on the downstream market, and, by strategic complementarity, firms 2 and d react by increasing their prices as well. By a revealed preference argument, these price increases benefit firm 1.
Having said that, it becomes clear that the upstream market cannot be supplied above marginal cost in equilibrium. As noted earlier, in our basic setting, Remark 1 implies that the perfect competition outcome is always a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Obviously, adding an unintegrated upstream competitor does not affect this result. 
Vertical separation
Policymakers have often contemplated the structural separation of a dominant operator.
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The typical argument in favor of vertical separation, which only applies when a firm has a monopoly position over a bottleneck, is that a vertically integrated firm has an incentive to use its upstream price to raise its rivals' costs; vertical separation then annihilates this incentive. Our argument is different. We claim that when several integrated firms compete on the upstream market, vertical separation of one integrated firm annihilates the softening effect and restores the firms' incentives to compete fiercely on the upstream market. To make this point, we assume that firm 2 has been vertically separated and call d1 and d2 the unintegrated downstream firms. We establish that, under an additional technical assumption, Proposition 7 extends to the vertical separation of an integrated firm. There is an important difference between vertical separation and the entry of an unintegrated upstream competitor in our framework: after vertical separation has taken place, there are two unintegrated downstream firms. This implies that we need both (i) and (ii) in Assumption 4 to prove Proposition 8.
To see why we need (i), consider that discrimination is allowed on the upstream market.
Then, we cannot exclude that the following situation arises in equilibrium. Integrated firm 1 offers upstream price a 1 to firm d1, and unintegrated upstream firm u offers price a u to firm 28 For instance, Viviane Reding, then member of the European Commission responsible for Information Society and Media declared in May 2007: "I believe that functional separation (. . . ) could indeed serve to make competition more effective in a service-based competition environment where infrastructure-based competition is not expected to develop in a reasonable period. It may be a useful remedy in specific cases. It is certainly not a panacea." (Viviane Reding, "How Europe can Bridge the Broadband Gap", Brussels, 14 May 2007).
29 Since the broadband industry has a three-tiered structure (local loop-wholesale products-retail services), two types of separation could be implemented. First, the local access unit of the incumbent operator could be separated from its wholesale-retail unit. Second, the Internet service provider unit of the incumbent could be separated from the local loop-wholesale unit. The latter situation has been observed in some countries. For instance, in France, the incumbent Internet service provider, Wanadoo, was a subsidiary of its parent company, France Télécom, between 2000 and 2004. 30 Notice that this assumption would not change the results of the previous sections, since Assumption 1 already ensured that the unintegrated downstream firm chose the cheapest supplier in our basic framework. d2, where a 1 and a u are the monopoly prices of firms 1 and u respectively.
31 Firm u prefers not to make an acceptable offer to unintegrated downstream firm d1, since, if that offer were eventually accepted, firm 1 would become more aggressive on the downstream market, which would erode the profit earned by firm u on firm d2. Similarly, firm 1 prefers not to make an acceptable offer to firm d2, since if that offer were accepted, firm 1 would become less aggressive on the downstream market. By strategic complementarity, firm d1 would increase its downstream price as well, which could lower its demand, and hence, the upstream profit that firm 1 makes on firm d1.
To understand point (ii) in Assumption 4, consider that firms cannot discriminate on the upstream market, but assume that unintegrated downstream firms elect their upstream suppliers before the downstream competition stage. Then, the following situation may be an equilibrium. Firms 1 and u set the monopoly upstream prices a 1 and a u , as defined in the previous paragraph. Consider that a 1 > a u , which makes sense, since a vertically integrated firm has more incentives than an unintegrated upstream firm to charge a high upstream price.
It may then be that firm d1 purchases from firm 1 to make the integrated firm less aggressive on the final market, while firm d2 chooses firm u to benefit from a lower upstream price.
The situations described in the above paragraphs seem rather unlikely, and we have not been able to exhibit them using standard demand specifications. Assumption 4 enables us to rule them out in our general framework.
Extensions and Discussions
We now discuss some extensions and robustness checks.
Robustness Checks
Two-part tariffs. We now show that partial foreclosure equilibria with positive upstream profits always exist under two-part tariff competition on the upstream market. Denote by a i (respectively, T i ) the variable (respectively, the fixed) part of the tariff set by firm i. In a monopoly-like outcome, firm i sets the variable part which maximizes the sum of its profit and firm d's profit, i.e., a tp = arg max a i π
32 while firm j makes no upstream offer. The fixed fee T i captures firm d's profit, i.e., T i = π
. This is an equilibrium provided that firm j does not want to undercut, or: π
31 Formally, a 1 = arg max a π (1,u) 1 (a, a u ) and a u = arg max a π
(a j , a k ) denotes the profit of firm i when firms d 1 and d 2 are supplied by firms j and k, respectively, at prices a j and a k .
32 See Bonanno and Vickers (1988) .
If the above inequality is not satisfied, then there exists an equilibrium in which both integrated firms charge the variable part a tp and a fixed fee equal to π
i (a tp ), which makes them indifferent between supplying the upstream demand or not. Under twopart tariff competition, this is a matching-like equilibrium. It can then be an equilibrium that one integrated firm supplies all unintegrated downstream firms at its monopoly upstream price. Lemmas 1 and 2 easily extend to larger numbers 33 For conciseness, we do not report other equilibria in which the upstream market is supplied by one firm, whose upstream offer is constrained by the offer of its integrated rival.
34 A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this is that prices are strategic complements.
35 If the equilibrium is monopoly-like, this is obvious. If it is matching-like, then the upstream profit is
, which is strictly positive by Lemma 2.
of firms: When one integrated firm sells the input at a strictly positive price-cost margin to all the entrants, it charges a strictly higher downstream price and earns a strictly smaller downstream profit than the other integrated firms. As a result, the integrated rivals may not want to undercut to benefit from the softening effect.
To go further, we prove the analog of Proposition 5 in this extended framework with M integrated firms and N downstream firms. As in Section 3.4.2, assume that downstream demands are derived from the maximization of a representative consumer's utility with the following preferences:
Suppose also that integrated firms have a cost dis-advantage δ relative to unintegrated downstream firms. We obtain the following result: Proof. See our web appendix, Section III (Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet and Schutz, 2010) .
Quantity competition. The softening effect exists if the upstream supplier can enhance its upstream profits by behaving softly on the downstream market. As discussed previously, this requires that it actually interacts with the unintegrated downstream firm. One may wonder whether the softening effect hinges on the assumption of price competition on the downstream market, for if the downstream strategic variables are quantities and all firms play simultaneously, then the upstream supplier can no longer impact its upstream profit through its downstream behavior. However, if for instance integrated firms are Stackelberg leaders on the downstream market, then the upstream supplier's quantity choice modifies its upstream profit, and the softening effect is still at work. To summarize, the question is not whether firms compete in prices or in quantities, but whether the strategic choice of a firm can affect its rivals' quantities.
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Upstream demand sharing. Throughout the paper, we have assumed that the upstream market could be supplied by one integrated firm only. Consider now that, when upstream offers are identical, the upstream demand is split equally between integrated firms. This would be a reasonable assumption if there were several downstream firms. In that case, we can still think about the upstream market in terms of softening effect and upstream profit effect. When the integrated firms share the upstream market, they both obtain some upstream profits, and they both benefit from a softening effect, since they both have incentives to protect their upstream revenues. Behaviors on the upstream market still trade off the softening effect and the upstream profit effect.
It becomes clear that the possibility for equilibrium partial foreclosure remains. Monopolylike equilibria feature the same outcome as in the basic model. Matching-like equilibria can also exist, in which the upstream market is shared between integrated firms. When Assumption 2 holds, we have identified conditions under which partial foreclosure arises in equilibrium. As mentioned in Section 3.1, Assumption 2 may hold for several reasons.
To begin with, there may be a regulation in place, which forces one or more integrated firms to make an acceptable upstream offer to downstream entrants. This, of course, is relevant in the telecommunications industry. In many European broadband markets, the incumbent's wholesale bitstream access offers are regulated. In some countries (e.g., Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden), the access price is set on a retail minus basis. In other countries (e.g., France, Italy, the Netherlands), the access price should be "cost-oriented." Similarly, in many European countries, MNOs are obliged to give access to their networks to MVNOs.
In some countries (e.g., Denmark, Sweden), this obligation has been put in force by law. In other countries (e.g., France, Germany), mobile licenses include a clause that forces the MNO to accept MVNO access requests. For example, in 2006, the French MNO SFR was refusing access to candidate MVNO Afone. Following a complaint to the regulatory authority, SFR was forced to provide an acceptable offer to Afone, due to the access obligation in its mobile licence.
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There may also be bypass opportunities. A downstream firm could pay a sunk cost to start producing its own input if this input is not available in the market, as explained at the end of Section 4.1. Again, integrated firms would then prefer to make an acceptable offer 37 For instance, using the Salop demand specification with d = 1/3, and assuming that the unintegrated downstream firm splits equally its demand when upstream prices are identical, we obtain the following subgame-perfect equilibria: the two monopoly-like outcomes, the perfect competition outcome, and a continuum of equilibria in which both integrated firms set the same price above marginal cost, and share the upstream demand.
Computations i (a m ) is greater than, π duo , the duopoly profit an integrated firm earns when firm d is squeezed from the market. In that case, complete foreclosure cannot be sustained at equilibrium.
In the following we exhibit two commonly used downstream demand systems, in which an integrated firm strictly prefers supplying the entrant than squeezing it from the market.
In these examples, monopoly-like equilibria continue to exist, even when Assumption 2 is not imposed. There exists a set of parameters (γ, δ) such that Assumption 2 holds together with the existence condition for monopoly-like equilibria. The following proposition precisely delineates the regions where partial foreclosure equilibria and complete foreclosure equilibria exist.
These areas are depicted in Figure 3 .
40
Proposition 11. Consider the asymmetric linear case without Assumption 2. There exist a 39 See Höffler (2008) . 40 Consistent with the idea that partial foreclosure is more likely when γ is large (Proposition 4), we observe that δ(γ) decreases in γ up to a thresholdγ with δ(γ) < 0. However, we also find that δ(γ) is negative and increasing when γ >γ. The reason is that when γ increases, competition becomes fiercer and the consequences of cost differentials are magnified. This implies that the cost differential δ(γ) needed to obtain equilibrium partial foreclosure goes to 0 as γ goes to infinity. This explains why δ(γ) eventually increases with γ. A similar insight obtains for δ(γ). In particular, the fact that δ(γ) is initially decreasing points to the intuition that complete foreclosure is more likely when downstream competition tightens as the entrant cannibalizes more of its supplier's downstream demand.
threshold γ > 0 and a cutoff function γ → δ(γ) such that δ(γ) ≤ δ(γ) if, and only if, γ ≥ γ, and:
(i) if δ < min{δ(γ), δ(γ)}, then the only equilibrium outcome is the Bertrand outcome;
(ii) if δ(γ) ≤ δ ≤ δ(γ), then there is an equilibrium with a monopoly-like outcome on the upstream market; (iii) if δ ≥ δ(γ), then there is an equilibrium with complete foreclosure on the upstream market.
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Proof. This proposition, as well as its extension to two-part tariffs and convex downstream costs (discussed below), is proven in Section I.2 of our web appendix (Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet and Schutz, 2010) . There exists a complete foreclosure equilibrium when the profits from supplying the entrant are small, which occurs when the entrant is rather inefficient: δ ≥ δ(γ). A monopolylike equilibrium emerges when the cost (dis-)advantage of the entrant is between [δ(γ), δ(γ)], which, in the linear example, is non-empty when final products are sufficiently strong sub-
These results may be used to build a typology of the competitive issues faced by nonintegrated entrants: inefficient entrants face a risk of complete foreclosure; fairly efficient entrants face a risk of partial foreclosure; finally, very efficient entrants enjoy a competitive upstream market and can compete on a level playing field. A similar insight obtains when integrated firms compete in two-part tariffs on the upstream market. In that case, we show that there exists a threshold δ tp (γ) such that the entrant is (i) fully foreclosed when δ > δ tp (γ) and (ii) partially foreclosed otherwise. The equilibrium in the latter case is the matching-like equilibrium of Proposition 9.
Another intuitive determinant for the emergence of partial or complete foreclosure is the cost structure. Consider indeed that downstream costs are convex. With decreasing returns to scale, it is profitable to split the cost between a vertically integrated firm and the entrant, which makes complete foreclosure less attractive. To confirm this intuition, we add a quadratic term c q D 2 k to the downstream cost function of every firm k ∈ {1, 2, d}, with c q > 0. By continuity of the profit functions in c q , Proposition 11 continues to hold as long as c q is not too large. Consistent with the intuition that diminishing returns to scale reduce the extent of complete foreclosure, we find that, as c q increases from 0, γ decreases and the partial foreclosure region expands.
Example 2: Spatial competition with exogenous locations. Firms compete on the Salop (1979) unit length circle, consumers have unit demands, transport costs are quadratic, and the gross utility is large enough to ensure that the market is covered in all equilibrium configurations. Note that integrated firms 1 and 2 are no longer symmetric when d = 1/3. Although our basic model has symmetric integrated firms, the assumption that their downstream divisions are symmetric is not crucial. When this assumption is relaxed, it is straightforward to adapt the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 to restate them as follows: For a i > c u , vertically integrated firm i charges a strictly higher downstream price and earns strictly smaller downstream profits if it supplies the upstream market at price a i than if its integrated rival does, p
We can also rewrite Proposition 1 with asymmetric integrated firms. To do so, notice first that the profit functions and the monopoly upstream prices, a u firm j's best undercutting price when firm i supplies the input at price a
in Proposition 1, which states that firm j prefers not to undercut, can be rewritten as
We find that, depending on the value of the distance d, either partial foreclosure or complete foreclosure can be sustained at equilibrium: Proposition 12. Consider the Salop specification without Assumption 2. There exists d ∈ (0, 1/3) such that:
• there is a monopoly-like equilibrium in which integrated firm 1 supplies the upstream market if, and only if, d ∈ (0, d);
• there is an equilibrium with complete foreclosure on the upstream market if, and only
• there is a monopoly-like equilibrium in which integrated firm 2 supplies the upstream market if, and only if, d ∈ (2/3 − d, 2/3).
Proof. This proposition, as well as the result on input differentiation (mentioned below), is proven in Section II of our web appendix.
A monopoly-like equilibrium emerges when the entrant's product is a close substitute to one of the integrated firms' product. In addition, the upstream market ends up being monopolized by the integrated firm whose final product is closer to the entrant's product. To understand the intuition, remember that there exists a monopoly-like equilibrium, in which firm 1 supplies the upstream market if and only if π duo ≤ π The softening effect is consequently strong, and firm 2 has little incentives to undercut. Put
m ) is more likely to be satisfied, i.e., firm 1 has less incentives to completely foreclose firm d, when distance d is small. This is because when firm 1 starts supplying firm d, firm 2 reacts to the entry of a new rival by lowering its downstream price, which hurts firm 1. This effect is weaker if firm 2 is less threatened by entry, which occurs when firm d is located closer to firm 1. Hence we get the surprising result that integrated firm 1 has more incentives to start supplying the entrant if the products of firms 1 and d are closer substitutes.
As a straightforward extension, consider that firm d's location depends on the identity of its upstream supplier. Assume now that firm d is located at distance d ≤ 1/3 from its upstream supplier. The interpretation is that the input is differentiated and that this differentiation translates into the final products, as in Ordover and Shaffer (2007) . This implies that d's product is a closer substitute to its wholesale supplier's product than to the other integrated firm's. In this case, integrated firms are still asymmetric, but their equilibrium profit functions now satisfy π integrated firm which starts supplying the downstream firm does not suffer too much from the adverse reaction of its integrated rival. Besides, the softening effect is strong, which weakens the incentives to undercut the upstream supplier. We can conclude that partial foreclosure becomes a more likely outcome when the input is more differentiated.
Conclusion
Our analysis has focused on the links between vertically-related markets, when the upstream good is an essential input to the downstream product, and when the competitors on the upstream market are also rivals on the downstream one. One of the main insights conveyed in the paper is that undercutting decisions on the upstream market trade off the softening effect and the upstream profit effect. Because of this, competition on these upstream markets may not be effective, and the monopoly outcome may persist even when competition in that market is possible.
Our results may rationalize the concerns expressed by the French Competition Authority when reviewing the proposed merger between two broadband providers, Cegetel and Neuf Telecom. Before the merger, these operators owned together between 30 and 50 percent of the national wholesale broadband market, while the incumbent historical operator (France Télécom) supplied the rest. The merger received clearance in August 2005 under the condition that the joint entity continued to provide its wholesale services, highlighting the perceived fear that the competition between two integrated firms on the upstream market may de facto lead to a monopoly.
42 Our analysis suggests that imposing such a constraint on one of the integrated incumbents may be an appropriate remedy to ensure that the wholesale market is competitive.
42 See DGCCRF, Décision C2005-44 related to the merger between Neuf Telecom and Cegetel.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that integrated firm i supplies the upstream market at price a i , and denote its integrated rival by j. To begin with, it is straightforward to see that we can normalize all upstream and downstream costs to c = c u = 0, by redefining upstream prices as a m (γ) − a * (γ) = 3(3 + γ)(6 + 5γ)(−648 − 1296γ − 864γ 2 − 183γ 3 + 5γ 4 ) (108 + 180γ + 93γ 2 + 13γ 3 )(648 + 1296γ + 909γ 2 + 249γ 3 + 20γ 4 ) .
Analyzing the above function, we establish that there exists γ > 0, such that a m (γ) ≥ a * (γ)
if, and only if, γ ≥ γ.
Since π (i)
i (0) = π (i) j (0) and 0 ≤ a m (γ), Proposition 2 implies that the perfect competition outcome is always an equilibrium. If γ < γ, then 0 < a m (γ) < a * (γ). By Proposition 1, (8) implies that there is no monopoly-like equilibrium. Moreover a * (γ) > a m (γ) implies by Proposition 2 that there is no other matching-like equilibrium than the perfect competition outcome.
Similarly, if γ ≥ γ, then a m (γ) ≥ a * (γ) and there exist monopoly-like equilibria. This is also a necessary and sufficient condition for the matching-like equilibrium with upstream price a * .
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Finally, to make sure that all these equilibria are indeed equilibria we have to check that, in the downstream competition subgame, the upstream supplier does not want to lower discontinuously its downstream price to drive firm d out of the market. This is proven in our web appendix (Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet and Schutz, 2010 , end of Section I.1).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Let i = j in {1, 2}. We show that the conditions stated in Proposition 6 are sufficient to
(c u ). To simplify the exposition, we introduce the following notations. p denotes the equilibrium downstream price set by the three firms when the upstream market is supplied at marginal cost. D denotes the demand addressed to each firm when all downstream prices are equal to p. We also denote by c and c the first and second derivatives of the downstream cost function when the quantity produced is D. Last, we define δ ≡ Let us now demonstrate that the perfect competition outcome is the only equilibrium.
Assume that firms 1 and u set a 1 = a u = c u . Obviously, firm u does not want to undercut.
Firm 1 does not want to undercut either, since it would then make upstream losses. Besides, we claim that all final prices would decrease, which gives even less incentives to undercut.
To see this, assume that firm 1 undercuts by settingâ < c u , and notice that the game defined by payoff functions (p k , p −k ) ∈ [0, +∞) 3 →π (i) k (p k , p −k , a) is smooth supermodular, parameterized by a ∈ {â, c u }. For all k, ∂π (i) k (., ., c u )/∂p k ≥ ∂π (i) k (., .,â)/∂p k , therefore, π (i) k (p k , p −k , a) has increasing differences in (p k , a) . Besides, the downstream equilibrium is, by assumption, unique. Supermodularity theory (see Vives 2001, Theorem 2. 3) tells us that the equilibrium of this game is increasing in a. Therefore, p
k (â) for all k. Therefore, the perfect competition outcome is an equilibrium.
Last, let us check that the upstream market cannot be supplied below cost in equilibrium.
First, if firm u supplies the upstream market below c u , it has a strictly profitable deviation: set a u = c u . Conversely, if firm 1 supplies the upstream market at a 1 < c u , then, we claim that it can also strictly increase its payoff by setting c u . To make this point, we need to distinguish two cases, depending on whether a u ≶ c u . First, if a u ≥ c u , then, firm 1's payoff increases, since the integrated firm gets rid of its upstream losses, and, using again the supermodularity argument developed in the previous paragraph, all downstream prices increase. If, on the other hand, a u < c u , then, firm u becomes the upstream supplier. Again, firm 1 gets rid of its upstream losses, and, using this time the supermodularity argument from the proof of Proposition 7, all prices increase. This concludes the proof.
